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of export prohibition, and especially by prohibiting the export of all goods declared as absolute and conditional contraband of war;

Second, by subordinating the granting of export permits into neutral countries, whence the reforwarding into enemy territory could take place, be this in these countries through the medium of already existing control-organs approved by the allies, be this—in the absence of such organizations—by means of special guarantees, such as the limitation of the quantities to be exported, the control of the allied consular agents, etc.

Transitory rules were adopted for the period of the commercial, industrial, agricultural, and maritime reconstruction of the allied countries as follows:

I. Proclaiming their solidarity for the restoration of the countries which are the victims of the destructions, spoliations, and abusive requisitions, the allies decide to find together ways and means to have these countries restored under special privileges, or to help them to reorganize the sources of their raw materials, their industrial and farming tools, their live stock and their merchant marine.

Revoke Favored Nation Clause.

II. In view of the fact that the war has ended all commercial treaties which bound them to the enemy powers, and considering that it is of essential interest that during the economical reconstruction which will follow the end of the war the freedom of none of the allies shall be hampered by the claim, which the enemy powers might set forth, of obtaining the treatment of a most favored nation, the allies agree that the benefit of this treatment cannot be granted to these powers for a number of years, which will be determined by an understanding among them.

The allies engage to give themselves mutual support during these years in every way possible, and to assure one to the other compensating markets, in case that harmful consequences might develop for their trade from the application of the engagement foreseen in the preceding paragraph.

3. The allies agree in their endeavor to preserve for the allied countries the natural resources during the period of the commercial, industrial, agricultural, and maritime restoration, and to this end they pledge themselves to make special arrangements which will facilitate the exchange of these resources.

4. In order to defend their commerce, their industry, their agriculture and their shipping against economic aggression, resulting from dumping or any other disloyal competitive procedure, the allies decide to come to an understanding in regard to fixing a period of time during which the trade of the enemy powers shall be subject to special rules, and goods coming from these countries shall be subject either to prohibition or to special rules which must be efficient.

Blacklist for Enemies.

The allies will come to an understanding through diplomatic channels in regard to these special rules to be imposed during the mentioned period on the ships of the enemy powers.

5. The allies will consider all common and particular steps to be taken in order to prevent enemy subjects in

their territory from doing business in certain industries or professions which are of interest for national defense or economic independence.

The allied governments propose to take at once steps necessary to free them entirely from dependence upon enemy countries both as to raw materials and manufactured articles. The sources of supply, the financial, commercial, and maritime phases of the problem will be worked out jointly by the allies.

In order to permit them mutually to exchange their products, the allies pledge themselves to take measures destined to facilitate this exchange, be it by establishing a direct and rapid service at reduced rates of transportation by land and water or be it by the development and improvement of the mail, telegraph, and other communications.

In regard to patents and trade-marks, works of literature and art created during the war in enemy countries, the allies will adopt rules which shall be, as much as possible, identical and which will be applied after the end of the war.

M. Clementel in a formal statement outlines the policy of the allies as follows:

"We shall conduct this economical fight in the French manner in order to organize the work of the nations according to their own genius, and not in the German manner in order to subdue them.

"Our enemies continue forging the arms of oppression. The Dyestuff Trust has closely gathered around the Radische Aniline Company other factories which represent more than one billion. Their admitted purpose is to preserve after the war their supremacy, owing to which Germany supplied up to now 87 per cent of the world's consumption in dyestuffs, and on account of which we were compelled to raise new products for an intensive production of melinite, which we need.

"Dumping is the favorite weapon of Germany for the attainment of commercial supremacy. It is one of a multitude of measures which have the purpose of ruining foreign competing industries.

"Against all these measures the Paris Conference has made its dispositions. If we were surprised by the outbreak of the war, we shall not be surprised by the coming peace. The allies are, economically, the stronger ones. They represent a population of 400,000,000 and control in large part raw materials.

"The economic superiority of the allies is evident. In order to insure it, it was not for a moment a question during the conference of adopting a common custom tax policy. Every one of the allies will retain its full independence."

THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF LIMITING ARMAMENTS

By GUSTAV SPILLER, London

General Secretary, International Union of Ethical Societies

PRIOR to the world war no pacifist proposal approached in popularity that of the limitation of armaments. The suggestion appeared eminently practical to the man in the street, who is sensitive in the matter of making financial contributions to the State and abominates international crises. If armaments could be sufficiently re-

duced, he argued, Parliament could increase its expenditure on constructive projects without needing to make intolerable demands on the taxpayer's purse. The absence of immense armaments would keep cool the heads of financial and other adventurers; and the race in armaments being arrested, international suspicions, hatreds, intrigues, crises, and wars would automatically pass away. Besides, the practical pacifist maintained that reforms must be gradual, and that, therefore, the only way of putting an end to militarism is by the *gradual* reduction of armaments.

The experiences of the world war have not lessened the enthusiasm for the foregoing proposal. It still appeals powerfully to the mass mind. International lawyers regard it as the only avenue leading to the temple of permanent peace. Moreover, considerable numbers of pacifists, intent on being practical, range themselves with its supporters. Scarcely a document published on the subject of a durable peace but pays homage to this proposal.

Yet enticingly plausible as the method appears to be, it fails to take note of the realities of the situation. Before the world war the inexperienced lay mind might easily have imagined that the armaments of nations could be as readily counted and limited as the toy armaments of a soldier's child. This view has become impossible, I submit, since the outbreak of hostilities. The war has deeply impressed on our minds the fact that modern armaments are in an unstable condition, and therefore unapproachable from the arithmetical standpoint. Who before the war suspected the existence of cannons which would reduce the most formidable fortresses to a dust heap in a few days? Or of long-range guns which are completely immune from counter-attack? Or what layman would have divined the fiendish potentialities of machine guns, particularly in connection with barbed-wire entanglements? Or the swift development of the submarine, aeroplane, and airship? These cannot be manifestly enumerated in an inventory. Nor could we solemnly state that each nation is restricted to so many cannon, machine guns, aeroplanes, or submarines, of such and such a character, when we know that before the limitation treaty is signed novel inventions will have rendered the treaty obsolescent and worthless. Indeed, such a treaty, if it ever came to be framed and accepted, would stimulate inventions beyond anything surmised in the past, and thus largely add to the incalculable element in armaments.

An effective limitation treaty would be therefore bound to stipulate that military inventions must cease or be impartially communicated to all powers, which is transparently absurd. It is as if we commanded the several general staffs to inform all powers of their plans.

And yet if the spirit of invention cannot be banned, the proposal to limit armaments represents an empty dream. Tomorrow a State may invent an engine of war which may double its military strength, and so long as this possibility exists every State will be constrained to arrange that many of its most active minds should devote their energies to perfecting its military instruments and supplementing these by novel ones. Accordingly, suspicions must remain rife, espionage common, distrust of other nations inevitable, and intrigues, crises, and wars recurrent.

The abolition of militarism by the gradual reduction

of armaments, and even the equal mutual limitation of armaments, constitute, therefore, conceptions which are entirely unpractical. Facing the facts fairly and squarely, those who are searching for the means of establishing a durable and endurable peace at the conclusion of this war must unreservedly admit that the proposal to limit armaments by mutual consent should be dismissed as visionary.

Armaments or no armaments, that is the question. However, whether it is practical or desirable that armaments should be dispensed with raises a new and momentous problem which I should like to discuss on another occasion.

[Mr. Spiller's second article will appear in the November ADVOCATE OF PEACE.]

AMERICA, JAPAN, AND CHINA

By BARON EI-ICHI SHIBUSAWA

MY visit to America in 1915 was, as I believe most Americans understand, not the result of any official mission, either on the part of the government or the people of Japan. I came solely as a private citizen and in my individual capacity. The several objects I had in view, all of a private nature, were satisfactorily attained, and I have returned to my own country with an increased sympathy with and understanding of the American people and their remarkable and prosperous land. Acquaintances formed among American business and professional men on the Pacific coast and elsewhere have been delightfully renewed, and in the many conversations that I have had with these representative Americans I have, I trust, been able to make clearer in their minds than ever before the friendly attitude and the spirit of cooperation that is slowly and surely uniting our two nations.

I was a boy of fourteen when, sixty-three years ago, the United States forcibly knocked at our door and awoke us from our dream of centuries. At that time I was at my father's home not far from Tokyo, dividing my time between the field and study of the Chinese classics and fencing. The times were getting exciting, and political agitators used to visit our district now and then. Boy as I was, I was deeply impressed by what they told us of the political situation, particularly of the alleged blunder of the Shogunate government in its foreign policy. I could not help feeling my breast swell with indignation at what I considered an unpardonable act of treason on the part of the Yokugawa officials in opening the country to foreign intercourse. Ten years later I left my father's home and joined the increasing band of political agitators, but a strange irony of fate soon after made me a retainer in the household of the Prince of Hitotsubashi, an immediate branch of the Shogun's family, and I was ordered to go to France for purposes of study. Once in that refined and enlightened country, I was cured of my mistaken antagonism to the progressive policy of my government, and I began to realize the significance of the step Japan had taken by the advice of the United States. It was, indeed, a turning point in the destiny of the nation, and it was fortunate that the power that set our face in the right direction in the nick of time was the trans-